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Abstract. In this paper we first introduce a logic for describing formally
a family of delegation and revocation models that are based on the work
in Hagstro¨m et al.. We then extend our logic to accommodate an epis-
temic interpretation of trust within the framework that we define. What
emerges from this work is a rich framework of formally well-defined del-
egation and revocation schemes that accommodates an important trust
component.
1 Introduction
Delegation and revocation are broad concepts that are fundamentally important
in modelling and reasoning about (dynamic) distributed systems. In the context
of multi-agent systems (MAS), delegation is important in relation to the coor-
dination of agents and for the coordinating of activities within organizational
structures [5]. Trust is, in turn, a fundamental notion in delegation and revoca-
tion; ordinarily, a principal i may delegate an access privilege a on an object o to
a principal j iﬀ i trusts j suﬃciently not to abuse the trust i has in j to perform
the action a in relation to o. In the context of revocation, it is when i loses trust
in j, in relation to exercising the privilege a on o, that i revokes the a privilege
on o from j. Although the importance of the trust dimension has been recog-
nized in delegation-revocation, it is our contention that more work is required on
the formal speciﬁcation and reasoning about trust in the context of delegation
and revocation. In this paper, our focus is on formally deﬁning a general, dy-
namic delegation-revocation framework that accommodates an important aspect
of trust. A feature of MAS is that agents are autonomous and therefore they can
act with respect to a subjective perception of the environment. For instance, a
veriﬁer may decide not to concede access to agents that she does not trust or that
have been delegated by other untrusted agents. In relation to this observation,
in this paper we contribute to the study of delegation and revocation in the con-
text of distributed systems, and multi-agent systems in particular, by addressing
the following key research question: How to deﬁne a formal framework to model
and reason about delegation and revocation in the context of multi-agent (and
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other distributed) systems? This generally stated question breaks down into at
least three important sub-questions that we intend to address: How to update
privileges on objects in a dynamic, multi-agent environment? How to specify and
reason about diﬀerent types of delegation and revocation schemes? How to study
delegation of access privileges when trust interferes with the fact that an agent
has been permitted to access?
Our main question and each of the subquestions that we consider have been
considered in the past, but the novelty of what we describe is to be understood in
terms of the new formal approaches that we introduce to address them. The need
for formal representations of security concepts is well understood (e.g., formal
representations of security concepts are important for constructing assurance
proofs). Our work is also motivated by the more speciﬁc observations that dis-
tributed access control systems can be seen as a type of a multi-agent system for
which delegation models in “classical” security need to be extended. We need
to also use our logical framework to reason about delegation-revocation policies
and we require fast and eﬀective tools for that. Delegation is an intrinsically dy-
namic process, therefore we additionally need to deﬁne dynamic operators that
formalize a range of delegation-revocation schemes. The explicit representation
of trust that we accommodate requires us to face two challenges: ﬁrst, how to
make the veriﬁer autonomous to decide whether to give access in case of there
being authorized but untrusted agents. Second, how to generalize the revocation
policies of Hagstro¨m et al. [9] by considering whether an agent who delegated a
permission is trusted or not. We address all of these issues in this paper.
The methodology that we employ in addressing these issues can be understood
in the following way. First, we show that our framework can embody delegation
and revocation schemes as addressed by the distributed access control commu-
nity. In particular, we model all of the revocation schemes that are semi-formally
introduced in [9] by using a dynamic variant of propositional logic. The work in
[9] is among the most general models to handle dynamics in delegation chains
and is the basis of several applied delegation models in security (Section 5 of [9]).
Second, we extend the proposed framework to study relationships between trust
and privilege delegation by explicitly modeling beliefs about trust relationships
among agents.
Our contributions on these things can be summarized thus: (i) we formalize, in
logic, the Hagstro¨m et al. framework (in [9], a semi-formal account is provided),
(ii) we demonstrate the translation of our logic into “programs” (a notion that
we will deﬁne later) that describe the eﬀects of performing delegation and revo-
cation actions, and (iii) we describe an extended form of our logic that allows
for representing and reasoning about the beliefs that agents have of principals
in a distributed delegation-revocation framework.
In Section 2, we describe a general authorization system, along the lines of
[9], and we give some basic deﬁnitions. In Section 3, we introduce the logic that
we use in order to represent formally the range of delegation and revocation
schemes, of the Hagstro¨m et al. type, that we consider. In Section 4, we describe
the use of our logic for representing delegation policies and, in Section 5, we
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describe the use of our logic for representing revocation schemes. In Section 6,
we make the key move of extending the formalization of policies expressible in
the Hagstro¨m et al. framework to accommodate an epistemic logic of trust. The
latter is used to account for reasoning about belief and trust in the delegation-
revocation context. In Section 7, we describe related work and, in Section 8, we
draw conclusions and make some suggestions for further work.
2 System Description
In this Section, we formalize the general concepts and notation introduced in-
formally in [9]. The notation is intended to represent a generic access control
framework using an ownership-based model with grant option for both positive
and negative permissions, and where negative permissions dominate positive
ones. We draw the reader’s to a simpliﬁed version of the distributed authoriza-
SOA Principal Verifier
Delegates
Permission
Delegates
Permission
Claims
Privilege
Fig. 1. The Authorization Model
(,)(,⊥) (⊥,⊥)
Fig. 2. Dominance Relation R
tion model described in [1,8], and illustrated in Figure 1, where an agent receives
a privilege, directly or indirectly, from a source of authority (SOA). The SOA is
an agent that has full power over a resource and is the ultimate authority w.r.t.
accesses to that speciﬁc resource. The veriﬁer is a particular agent in charge
of checking whether another agent, who received a privilege directly or indi-
rectly from the SOA, that wants to exercise an access permission is authorized
so to do.
2.1 Basics
Let AG be a ﬁnite set of agents (users) in the authorization system. Let O
be the (ﬁnite) set of system objects for which authorizations can be stated.
Finally, let A be the (ﬁnite) set of accesses over objects; by accesses we mean the
actions that agents may perform on objects. We assume that all authorizations
in the system are stored in an authorization speciﬁcation AUTH , and that every
authorization is of the form (i, j, (a, o), alp, dlp) where, i and j are two agents,
the grantor and the subject ; (a, o) is an access type and speciﬁes an action a
on a object o; alp ∈ {,⊥} (access level permission) is a ﬂag which speciﬁes if
the authorization is an access level permission alp =  or an access level denial
alp = ⊥; dlp ∈ {,⊥} (delegation level permission) is a ﬂag which speciﬁes
whether or not the authorization gives to j the authority to further delegate
the permission. For instance, the authorization (i, j, (a, o),,) ∈ AUTH says
that agent i gives agent j the permission to perform action a on object o and
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the authority to further delegate this permission to other principals. On the
contrary (i, j, (a, o),,⊥) ∈ AUTH means that j still gets from i the permission
to perform the a action on o but she is not granted by i to further delegate the
permission. In case of an authorization being a denial, i.e., alp = ⊥, we require
also dlp to be ⊥ in order to represent that the agent cannot delegate a permission
to access what she does not have herself. Hence, in our model we have three
possible permissions (i.e., (,), (,⊥), (⊥,⊥)).
Definition 1 (Positive and Negative Permissions). Given an authoriza-
tion (i, j, (a, o), alp, dlp), we refer to (alp, dlp) as a negative permission if alp =
⊥; otherwise, we call it a positive permission.
When a user receives both a positive and a negative permission for the same
(action, object) pair, there is a “conﬂict” between the two assignments. Hence,
the set of permissions is divided into one set of active permissions and one set
of inactive permissions. Active permissions can be inactivated when a negative
permission is granted (e.g., during a revocation). Inactive permissions, instead,
can be activated when a negative permission for the same target is removed.
In Figure 2, we illustrate a dominance relation R between permissions such
that if (alp, dlp)R(alp′, dlp′) reads as, if an agent i has permission (alp, dlp) then
it can grant an authorization of type (i, , ( , ), alp′, dlp′). Intuitively, (alp, dlp)
R(alp′, dlp′) means that permission (alp, dlp) is stronger than (alp′, dlp′).
In line with [9], we require an authorization speciﬁcation to satisfy the follow-
ing property:
Definition 2 (Connectivity Property). For all authorizations in AUTH,
if an agent i is the grantor of a permission (alp, dlp) for permissions target
(a, o) to the subject j, then i must have a permission (alp′, dlp′) such that
(alp′, dlp′)R(alp, dlp).
The connectivity property can be considered as a constraint over the authoriza-
tion speciﬁcation AUTH . Intuitively, it assures that if an agent i delegates a
permission (alp, dlp) to j for the access type (a, o) then she has the permission
to do so.
Definition 3 (Delegation Chain). Given an access type (a, o), a delegation
chain [x1, x2, . . . , xn](a,o) is a sequence of authorizations of the form (x1, x2,
(a, o), alp1, dlp1), . . . , (xn−1, xn, (a, o), alpn, dlpn).
An agent j is granted the access type (a, o) if and only if the veriﬁer can check
the existence of a rooted delegation chain, which we deﬁne next.
Definition 4 (Rooted Delegation Chain). A delegation chain [x1, x2,
. . . , xn](a,o) is rooted if and only if the following hold: x1 is a source of au-
thority for object o; all agents x2, . . . , xn−1 have an active privilege (,) for
access type (a, o); agent xn has an active privilege (, dlp) with dlp ∈ {,⊥}.
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The notion of rooted delegation chain is pivotal because it corresponds to the
notion of permission in standard access control. In this view, the connectivity
property assures that if (i, j, (a, o), alp, dlp) ∈ AUTH then there is a rooted
delegation chain that links j to a source of authority for o. In [9], Hagstro¨m et al.
impose the above property to hold in any authorization speciﬁcation. However,
in highly distributed scenarios (e.g., GRID systems) it may be extremely diﬃcult
to enforce the connectivity property a priori for every access type (a, o) (see [8]
for an example). In Section 3, we relax this requirement and we give a formal
account of the properties reported above in order to check whether a node in
the authorization speciﬁcation is part of a rooted chain.
As reported in [9], the chains of granted authorizations in a system can be
represented by directed graphs. The nodes contain information about subject,
object and access type, and the arcs are labelled with the granted permission
(alp, dlp). There is an arc from node (i, (a, o)) to node (j, (a, o)) if there is an
entry in the authorization speciﬁcation with (i, j, (a, o), alp, dlp). An arc from
node i to node j is labelled with the permission granted by user i to user j.
Active arcs have unbroken lines and inactive arcs have dashed lines to indicate
that although they are still in AUTH , they are not in eﬀect because they have
been overruled by a negative permission.
3 The Logic
We extend the propositional language Prop with dynamic operators to specify
programs that update an authorization speciﬁcation by issuing (or revoking)
credentials certiﬁcates.
Definition 5 (Syntax). We deﬁne inductively the language L as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | [π]ϕ π ::= +p | −p | ϕ? | π ∪ π | π;π
where p ranges over Φ = {soai,o, (i, (a, o), j)D+ , (i, (a, o), j)D− , (i, (a, o), j)P+, (i, (a, o),
j)P− | a ∈ A, o ∈ O, i, j ∈ AG}, with A,O and AG being ﬁnite sets.
The propositional atoms in Φ describe the state of the authorization system.
soai,o reads as: “agent i is the source of authority over object o”. To describe the
steps of delegation chains we use triples such that (i, (a, o), j)P+ (resp. (i, (a, o), j)
D
+ )
reads as: “there is a certiﬁcate supporting that i delegates an access (resp. del-
egation) level permission to j” while (i, (a, o), j)P− (resp. (i, (a, o), j)
D
−) reads as:
“there is a certiﬁcate supporting that i gives a negative access (resp. delegation)
level permission”.
Given a generic dynamic formula [π]ϕ we read it as follows: “after executing
program π, the formula ϕ holds true”. A program is therefore intended as a
sequence of instructions such that : [+p]ϕ (resp. [−p]ϕ) reads as: “after mak-
ing p true (resp. false), ϕ holds”; [ϕ?]ψ reads as: “If ϕ is true, then ψ is the
case”; [π ∪ π′]ϕ reads as: “after executing π, ϕ holds and, after executing π′, ϕ
holds”; [π;π′]ϕ reads as: “After executing π and then π′, ϕ holds”. For read-
ability, we adopt the following abbreviations: (i, (a, o), j)P,D+
def= (i, (a, o), j)P+ ∧
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(i, (a, o), j)D+ ; ¬(i, (a, o), j)P,D− def= ¬(i, (a, o), j)P− ∧ ¬(i, (a, o), j)D− ; if ϕ then τ1
else τ2
def= ((ϕ?; τ1) ∪ (¬ϕ?; τ2)); for all (x ∈ {s1, . . . , sn}) do τ1(x) end for
def= τ1(s1); . . . ; τ1(sn).
Definition 6 (Semantics). A valuation Θ is a function assigning a truth value
to each propositional atom: Θ : Φ → {,⊥}. Given a valuation Θ of propositional
logic and p ∈ Φ, the updates Θ+p and Θ−p are deﬁned as follows.
Θ+p(q) =
{ if p = q,
Θ(q) otherwise.
Θ−p(q) =
{⊥ if p = q,
Θ(q) otherwise.
Let Θ be a valuation and φ ∈ L. The satisfaction relation Θ |= φ is deﬁned
inductively as follows (we omit ¬ and ∧).
Θ |= p iﬀ Θ(p) =  Θ |= [ψ?]φ iﬀ Θ |= ψ → φ
Θ |= [+p]φ iﬀ Θ+p |= φ Θ |= [π;π′]φ iﬀ Θ |= [π][π′]φ
Θ |= [−p]φ iﬀ Θ−p |= φ Θ |= [π ∪ π′]φ iﬀ Θ |= [π]φ ∧ [π′]φ
We exploit our basic dynamic operators to model certiﬁcate creation
(granting) and deletion (revoking) by deﬁning the following programs: i (a,o)−−−→D
j
def
= +(i, (a, o), j)D+ ; i
(a,o)←−−−D j def= −(i, (a, o), j)D+ ; i (a,o)−−−→P j def= +(i, (a, o), j)P+;
i
(a,o)←−−−P j def= −(i, (a, o), j)P+; i −(a,o)−−−−→ j def= +(i, (a, o), j)P−; +(i, (a, o), j)D− ; i −(a,o)←−−−−
j
def
= −(i, (a, o), j)P−;−(i, (a, o), j)D− . For instance, i
(a,o)−−−→D j reads as: “a certiﬁ-
cate supporting that i grants j the authority to delegate (a, o) is issued.” while
i
−(a,o)−−−−→P j reads as: “a certiﬁcate supporting a negative permission granted by i
to j for (a, o) is issued”.
Next, we deﬁne the logic that we use for our delegation-revocation framework.
Definition 7. The logic L is deﬁned by the following axiom schemes and infer-
ence rules.
Taut 	 φ for all propositional tautologies φ based on Φ
K+ 	 [+p](φ → ψ)→ ([+p]φ → [+p]ψ)
K- 	 [−p](φ → ψ)→ ([−p]φ → [−p]ψ)
Det+ 	 ¬[+p]φ ↔ [+p]¬φ
Det- 	 ¬[−p]φ ↔ [−p]¬φ
Test 	 [ψ?]φ ↔ (ψ → φ)
Red1 	 [+p]p
Red2 	 [+p]q ↔ q if p = q
Red3 	 [−p]¬p
Red4 	 [−p]q ↔ q if p = q
Comp 	 [π;π′]φ ↔ [π][π′]φ
Choice 	 [π ∪ π′]φ ↔ [π]φ ∧ [π′]φ
Nec If 	 φ then 	 [+p]φ and 	 [−p]φ
MP If 	 φ and 	 φ → ψ then 	 ψ
Proposition 1. For all formula φ ∈ LD, there is Red(φ) ∈ Prop such that
 φ ↔ Red(φ). The reduction of φ to Red(φ) is polynomial in the size of φ
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Proof (sketch). We prove it by successive inductions. We use in great extent
the ‘reduction’ axioms K+, K-, Det+, Det-, Test, Red1 to Red4: they all ‘push
through’ the connectives, except for the basic cases Test and Red1-Red4 where
the dynamic modalities [+p] and [-p] disappear.
The above proposition is extremely important because it shows that every dy-
namic formula of the type [π]ϕ can be reduced in an equivalent static formula
in standard propositional logic. As a consequence of Proposition 1 we get the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. The semantics of LD is sound and complete w.r.t. the logic L. The
logic L is also decidable and NP -complete.
Definition 8 (Rooted Delegation Chain). In the system represented by a
valuation Θ, there is a rooted delegation chain ending at the node (j, (a, o)) iﬀ
Θ |= CP∅(j, (a, o)), where
CPS(j, (a, o)) =∨
i∈S
(
((i, (a, o), j)P+ ∧ ¬(i, (a, o), j)P− ∧ soai,o)∨
((i, (a, o), j)P+ ∧ ¬(i, (a, o), j)P− ∧ CPP,DS∪{i,j}(i, (a, o))
)
CPP,DS (j, (a, o)) =∨
i∈S
(
((i, (a, o), j)P,D+ ∧ ¬(i, (a, o), j)P,D− ∧ soai,o)∨
((i, (a, o), j)P,D+ ∧ ¬(i, (a, o), j)P,D− ∧ CPP,DS∪{i,j}(i, (a, o))
)
Intuitively, CPS(j, (a, o)) reads as: “There is a rooted delegation chain (with no
agent in S) such that j is granted an access level permission (i.e., alp = ) for
(a, o)”. Notice that our deﬁnition of CPS(j, (a, o)) is well-founded because we
have a ﬁnite number of agents, object and actions.
An authorization that has the connectivity property as reported in Deﬁnition 2
can be seen as a particular valuation which complies with the following deﬁnition.
Definition 9 (Connectivity Property). A system represented by a valuation
Θ has the connectivity property iﬀ for all access types (a, o), Θ |= CP(a, o), where
CP(a, o) = ∧
i∈AG
(
(i, (a, o), j)P+ → CP∅(i, (a, o))
)
We now introduce two notions that are pivotal in formally deﬁning the revocation
schemes presented in Section 5.
Definition 10 (Independency). In a system represented by Θ, given a subject
j with a permission (alp, dlp) for access type (a, o), j is said to be independent
of a subject i iﬀ Θ |= CP{i}(j, (a, o))
Definition 11 (Reachability). In a system represented by a valuation Θ we
say that j is reachable from i via a delegation chain for access type (a, o) iﬀ
Θ |= R∅(j, i, (a, o)) where RS(j, i, (a, o)) = (i, (a, o), j)P+ ∨ ∨
x/∈S
(
(x, (a, o), j)P,D+ ∧
RS∪{x}(x, i, (a, o))
)
1
1 Notice that we do not check for the arc in the delegation chain to be active.
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Automated Theorem Proving. As shown in Proposition 1, the logic deﬁned
above is sound and complete w.r.t. propositional logic. In order to show how
to use state of the art theorem provers to reason about delegation and revoca-
tion schemes, we developed a parser (written in SCHEME) which implements a
set of complete reduction axioms and translates dynamic formulas, as reported
in Deﬁnition 5, into (static) propositional logic. The parser translates a set of
formulas written in our logical framework into ﬁrst-order formulas compatible
with SPASS [15] syntax. Due that our language is ﬁnite, SPASS automatically
instantiates the translated formulas into propositional logic and then uses a SAT
solver to check satisﬁability2.
4 Delegation Schemes
As pointed out in [8], in the information security literature, delegation normally
describes the act of distributing privileges to agents in distributed systems. In
general, there are two possible kinds of delegation:
Delegation as creation of new privilege: the delegatee receives its own
privilege which is independent of the delegator’s privilege in the sense that if
the delegator’s privilege is revoked, then it does not necessarily mean that the
delegatee’s privilege is revoked. A special case is the transfer of a new privilege,
which models the creation of a new privilege and a revocation of an old one;
Delegation by proxy: The delegatee does not receive its own privilege, but
can exercise the privilege through the delegator, in the sense that the delegator
speaks for or acts on behalf of the delegator.
On the ﬁrst type of delegation, an agent i has a direct privilege to act on
an object o if she is the SOA for it (i.e., soai,o). To model delegation by proxy
instead, we need to keep track of the delegation chains (represented through
atoms like (i, (a, o), j)P,D+ ) on which an agent depends for a given privilege.
We can accommodate the diﬀerent types of delegation by exploiting the dy-
namic operators deﬁned in the previous section. For instance, we can model
delegation as creation of new privileges with the following programs: “Agent i
assigns (if she has the power) a new privilege on object o to agent j”: (if soai,o
then +soaj,o); “Agent i transfers her privilege over o to agent j”: (if soai,o
then −soai,o; +soaj,o).
5 Revocation Schemes
In this section, we deﬁne the revocation operations that are informally described
in [9]. The following schemes are suﬃciently general to model a great deal of
real-world distributed authorization architectures. The main contribution of this
section is that for each revocation scheme S we deﬁne a program πS such that
we read [πS ]ϕ as: “after the execution of a revocation operation S, ϕ holds”.
2 The parser is available at
http://www.di.unito.it/~genovese/tools/delegation2spass.zip
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Due to space constraints, we refer to πS [n −m] as the block instructions from
line n to m of the program πS .
As in [9], we divide revocation schemes into positive and negative, depend-
ing on the revocation action of deleting a certiﬁcate or of issuing a negative
permission.
When i revokes a permission to j, we identify two types of agents: (i) those
that are not independent from i and delegated the same permission to j (see
Deﬁnition 10) and (ii) those that are reachable from j (see Deﬁnition 11) in
the delegation chain. We classify a revocation operation as weak/strong and
local/global, depending on how it inﬂuences agents of type (i) and (ii). A revo-
cation operation is weak (resp. strong) if, in revoking a permission from i to j,
none (resp. all) of the agents of type (i) are forced to revoke their delegation.
Instead, we classify a revocation operation as local (resp. strong) if the algorithm
inﬂuences none (resp. all) of the agents of type (ii).
An important property of all the programs implementing the revocation
schemes is as follows
Theorem 2 (Invariance under connectivity). After the execution of any
program implementing the revocation schemes, the resulting delegation chain sat-
isﬁes the connectivity property.
5.1 Positive Revocation Schemes
Weak Local Delete. The weak local delete operation is the simplest form
of revocation. After the application of the weak local delete operation on a
permission (alp, dlp) for a given access type (a, o) granted by agent i to j, the
following three post-conditions must be satisﬁed [9]: i no longer grants j the
permission (alp, dlp); Permissions for (a, o) granted to j by users other than i are
intact; Permissions for subjects other than j are intact. However, the grantors
of permissions for users directly following j in the graph for (a, o) may have
changed in order for the connectivity property to be satisﬁed;
In Figure 4 we show the resulting delegation chain after the execution of
program WLDi,j .
Strong Local Delete. The application of the strong local delete operation
on a permission (alp, dlp) for access type (a, o) granted by agent i to agent j
has to satisfy the following post-conditions: i no longer grants j the permission
(alp, dlp); Permissions for access type (a, o) granted to j by every agent z other
than i are intact if they are independent of i. Otherwise, they are restricted to
satisfy the connectivity property for those paths from z that are independent of i;
Positive (and negative) permissions for agents other than j are intact. However,
the grantors of permissions for agents directly following j in the graph for (a, o)
may have changed in order for the connectivity property to be satisﬁed. In Figure
6, we show the resulting delegation chain after the execution of program SLDi,j.
Weak global delete. After the application of a weak global delete operation
on a permission (alp, dlp) for an access type (a, o) granted by i to j, the following
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i, (a, o) j, (a, o)
z, (a, o)
k, (a, o)
w, (a, o) q, (a, o)
,
, ,
,⊥
⊥,⊥,
,⊥
Fig. 3. A Delegation Chain
i, (a, o) j, (a, o)
z, (a, o)
k, (a, o)
w, (a, o) q, (a, o)
,
⊥,⊥,
,⊥
,
,⊥
Fig. 4. Weak Local Delete
1: i
(a,o)←−−−D,P j;
2: for all k ∈ AG do
3: if ((j, (a, o), k)P+ ∧ ¬CP∅(j, (a, o))) then
4: j
(a,o)←−−−P k;
5: if (¬CP∅(k, (a, o))) then
6: i
(a,o)−−−→P k;
7: end if
8: end if
9: if ((j, (a, o), k)D+ ∧ ¬CP∅(j, (a, o))) then
10: j
(a,o)←−−−D k;
11: if (¬CP∅(k, (a, o))) then
12: i
(a,o)−−−→D k;
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
Fig. 5. WLDi,j Program
i, (a, o) j, (a, o)
z, (a, o)
k, (a, o)
w, (a, o) q, (a, o)
,
⊥,⊥,
,
,⊥
Fig. 6. Strong Local Delete
1: i
(a,o)←−−−P,D j;
2: for all x ∈ AG do
3: if ((x, (a, o), j)P+ ∧ ¬CP{i}(x, (a, o))) then
4: x
(a,o)←−−−D j;x (a,o)←−−−P j;
5: end if
6: end for
7: WLDi,j [2− 15]
Fig. 7. SLDi,j Program
i, (a, o) j, (a, o)
z, (a, o)
k, (a, o)
w, (a, o) q, (a, o)
,
Fig. 8. Strong Global Delete
i, (a, o) j, (a, o)
z, (a, o)
k, (a, o)
w, (a, o) q, (a, o)
,
,
,⊥
Fig. 9. Weak Global Delete
post-conditions must satisﬁed: i no longer grants j the permission (alp, dlp) for
access type (a, o); Permissions from the same access type (alp, dlp) granted to j
by users other than i are intact; The permissions of all subjects that have been
granted by j may change depending on whether other principals granted some
permission for the same access type. A suitable situation to use the weak global
delete operation is when i loses her trust in j but she still trusts that other
guarantees to make their own judgements about him. Also, since i no longer
trusts j with the permission previously given, in turn she no longer trusts any
subject trusted by j, and so on. In Figure 9, we show the resulting delegation
chain after the execution of program WGDi,j .
Strong global delete. After the application of a strong global delete opera-
tion on a permission (alp, dlp) for an access type (a, o) granted by i to j, the
following post-conditions must be satisﬁed: i no longer grants j the permission
(alp, dlp); Positive permissions for the same access type (a, o) granted to j or any
descendant of j by every user z other than i are intact if they are independent
of i. Otherwise, they are adjusted (i.e., restricted) to satisfy the connectivity
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1: i
(a,o)←−−−P,D j;
2: for all x ∈ AG do
3: if ((x, (a, o), j)P+ ∧ ¬CP{i}(x, (a, o))) then
4: x
(a,o)←−−−P j;x (a,o)←−−−D j;
5: end if
6: if R∅(x, j, (a, o)) then
7: WGDi,j [2− 10]
8: end if
9: end for
Fig. 10. SGDi,jProgram
1: i
(a,o)←−−−P,D j;
2: for all x ∈ AG do
3: if R∅(x, j, (a, o)) then
4: for all y ∈ AG do
5: if ((y, (a, o), x)P+ ∧ ¬CP∅(y, (a, o))) then
6: y
(a,o)←−−−P x; y (a,o)←−−−D x;
7: end if
8: end for
9: end if
10: end for
Fig. 11. WGDi,j Program
property for those paths from z back to a SOA that is independent of i. Nega-
tive permissions of the same type are intact; The permissions of all subjects that
have been granted either directly or transitively, by j may have been adjusted
in order for the connectivity property to be satisﬁed. In Figure 8 we show the
resulting delegation chain after the execution of program SGDi,j .
Negative Revocation Schemes. Negative revocation schemes diﬀer from pos-
itive ones in that revocation is done not by deleting a positive certiﬁcate but
by issuing a negative permission. The outcome of such schemes is exactly the
same as the positive ones (permission is revoked) but a negative permission
make it easier to go back to the previous state when negative permission is in
turn revoked. For this reason we refer to [9] for an intuitive description of the
schemes.3
6 An Epistemic Approach to Trust
The outcomes of executing a delegation or a revocation action, as presented in
Sections 4 and 5, depend only on the authorization policy. The decision points
of the programs presented so far are checked against the presence of information
that is at system (institutional) level, like “is this agent a source of authority?”
or “do we have evidence of a particular delegation certiﬁcate being held?”.
However, one of the features of MAS is that agents are autonomous and there-
fore they can act w.r.t. a subjective and internal perception of the environment.
We next show that this subjective dimension can be naturally accommodated in
our logic by explicitly representing beliefs of agents with a standard epistemic
modal operator.
A crucial subjective dimension in authorization is the one of trust among
agents. In particular, we are interested in policy requirements like: “An agent i
trusts agent j on (a, o) while j is not considered trustworthy by agent k”.
The possibility of expressing subjective statements about trust enriches the
model, which we describe above, in several respects:
3 For space constraints we refer to a companion technical report [4] for a formalization
of negative schemes.
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Verification: For a veriﬁer to grant a privilege it is not suﬃcient that the
delegation chain is rooted according to Deﬁnition 4, but we require the chain to
be such that all the agents are trusted by the veriﬁer.
Delegation: An agent i delegates a permission to agent j not only if i has the
privilege to do so but also if i trusts j.
Revocation: The introduction of trust can generalize the revocation schemes
presented in Section 5. To see that, suppose that agent i wants to revoke a
permission from agent j, then depending on whether i trusts j or not: 1. The
agent i may want to remove the same permission from of all the other agents
delegated by j that are not trusted by i; 2. The agent i may force all the other
agents that gave the same privilege to j to revoke it if i does not trust them.
In what follows, we give a formal account of how to accommodate trust in all
of the diﬀerent respects that we reported above.
Definition 12. A trust model is a tuple M = (W,R, V,w) where: W is a set
of possible worlds and w ∈ W ; R : AG → 2W×W is a function assigning to each
agent an accessibility relation on W ; V : Φ → 2W is a function assigning to each
propositional letter a set of possible worlds.
Definition 13. The language LT is deﬁned inductively as follows:
L : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Bjφ
where p in ΦT = {t(i, (a, o)), | a ∈ A, o ∈ O, i, j ∈ AG}.
The truth conditions of the relation M,w |= φ are deﬁned inductively as usual
(we omit ¬ and ∧).
M,w |= p iﬀ w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= Bjφ iﬀ for all v ∈ Rj(w),M, v |= φ
Intuitively, t(j, (a, o)) reads as: “j is trusted on (a, o)” and Bit(j, (a, o)) reads
as: “i trusts j on (a, o)”.
In the remainder of this section, we show how we can (independently) merge
the trust model as described above, with the delegation model introduced in
previous sections.
Definition 14. A trust-authorization model is a pair {(M,w), Θ} of an inter-
nal trust-model (M,w) and a valuation Θ on Φ.
Definition 15. We deﬁne inductively the language L as follows:
φ ::= p | ψ | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | [π]φ π ::= +p | −p | φ? | π ∪ π | π;π
where p ranges over Φ and ψ ranges over LT . Its truth conditions on the set
of internal trust delegation models are deﬁned as follows (we omit ¬ and ∧):
{(M,w), Θ} |= p iﬀ Θ |= p
{(M,w), Θ} |= ψ iﬀ M,w |= ψ
{(M,w), Θ} |= [π]φ iﬀ {(M,w), Θπ} |= φ
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Theorem 3. The semantics of the language L is completely axiomatized by the
following axiom schemes and inference rules:
LD All axiom schemes and inference rules of LD
KB 	 Bj(φ → φ′)→ (Bjφ → Bjφ′)
Red5 	 [π]ψ ↔ ψ
Nec If 	 φ then 	 Bjφ
where ψ ranges over LT and j over AG.
More generally, as put forward by Abadi in [2], the use of an (epistemic) modal
language permits to specify and reason about authorization in distributed envi-
ronments by associating policies (i.e., formulae) to agents. For space constraints,
we only give some examples of how to express such policies: If the computer
science department supports that the university is trusted on (a, o), then the
department will trust any other agent trusted by the university on the same
access type: (Bcs dept(uni, (a, o)) →
∧
j∈AG
(Bunit(j, (a, o)) → Bcs dept(j, (a, o)))) ; If j
does not trust i then he will not trust any other agent k that delegates a per-
mission to j: (Bj(¬t(i, (a, o)))→ ∧
k∈AG
((k, (a, o), j)P+ → Bj¬t(k, (a, o)))) ; Whatever
is supported by the university is supported by the computer science department
too: (Buniϕ → Bcs depϕ) , for any ϕ4.
Verification. When a veriﬁer i has to check whether an agent j is permitted
to perform action a on object o, she does not check for a rooted chain in which
all the agents involved are trusted by i. Note that this is an inherently internal
perspective which is independent from the external point of view of institutional
notions, like authorization and permission. Faced with the same request, two
veriﬁers can react diﬀerently depending on which agents they trust.
Definition 16. In a trust-authorization system represented by {(M,w), Θ} a
veriﬁer i supports that j has the privilege for (a, o) iﬀ {(M,w), Θ} |= DT ∅(i, j,
(a, o)), where
DT S(i, j, (a, o)) = Bit(j, (a, o))∧
(
∨
w ∈S
(
((w, (a, o), j)P+ ∧ ¬(w, (a, o), j)P− ∧ soaw,o
∧Bit(w, (a, o)) ∧Bit(j, (a, o)))∨
((w, (a, o), j)P+ ∧ ¬(w, (a, o), j)P− ∧Bit(w, (a, o)) ∧Bit(j, (a, o))
∧DT P,DS∪{w,j}(i, w, (a, o))
)
DT P,DS (i, j, (a, o)) = Bit(j, (a, o))∧
(
∨
w ∈S
(
((w, (a, o), j)P,D+ ∧ ¬(w, (a, o), j)P,D− ∧ soaw,o
∧Bit(w, (a, o)) ∧Bit(j, (a, o)))∨
((w, (a, o), j)P,D+ ∧ ¬(w, (a, o), j)P,D− ∧Bit(w, (a, o)) ∧Bit(j, (a, o))∧
DT P,DS∪{w,j}(i, w, (a, o))
)
4 This formula has to be intended as an axiom schema, the corresponding canonical
property is: ∀x, y(xRcs depy → xRuniy).
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Delegation. Also delegation schemes can be naturally parameterized in terms
of a subjective dimension of trust. For instance, w.r.t. delegation via transfer we
can deﬁne the following programs: - (if (soai,o∧Bi(t(j, o))) then +soaj,o) - (if
(soai,o ∧Bi(t(j, o))) then −soai,o; +soaj,o)
Revocation. The schemes in Section 5 can be generalized with the revocation
program in Figure 12 whose eﬀects depend on the trust relationships between the
revokee and the other agents in the delegation chain. The program generalizes
the weak/strong and global/local dimensions of positive5 revocation algorithms
as presented in Section 5. For instance, in [9] WGDi,j is motivated as “. . . agent
i loses trust in agent j but still trusts other agents to make their own judgement
on j”. The block TBR[21 − 25] generalizes precisely this case, depending on
whether i trusts other agents that are not independent from him, the relative
permission may be revoked.
1: i
(a,o)←−−−P,D j;
2: if Bit(j, (a, o)) then
3: for all x ∈ AG do
4: if (x, (a, o), j)P+ ∧ ¬CP{i}(x, (a, o)) ∧Bi¬t(x, (a, o)) then
5: x
(a,o)←−−−P,D j;
6: end if
7: if ((j, (a, o), x)P+ ∧ ¬CP∅(j, (a, o))) then
8: j
(a,o)←−−−P x;
9: if (¬CP∅(x, (a, o)) ∧Bit(x, (a, o))) then
10: i
(a,o)−−−→P x;
11: end if
12: end if
13: if ((j, (a, o), x)D+ ∧ ¬CP∅(j, (a, o))) then
14: j
(a,o)←−−−D x;
15: if (¬CP∅(x, (a, o)) ∧Bit(x, (a, o))) then
16: i
(a,o)−−−→D x;
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end if
21: if Bi¬t(j, (a, o)) then
22: for all x ∈ AG do
23: if ((x, (a, o), j)P+ ∧ ¬CP{i}(x, (a, o)) ∧Bit(x, (a, o)) then
24: x
(a,o)←−−−P j;x (a,o)←−−−D j;
25: end if
26: if R∅(x, j, (a, o)) ∧ ¬Bit(x, (a, o)) then
27: for all y ∈ AG do
28: if ((y, (a, o), x)P+ ∧ ¬CPi(y, (a, o))) then
29: y
(a,o)←−−−P x; y (a,o)←−−−D x;
30: end if
31: end for
32: end if
33: end for
34: end if
Fig. 12. Trust Based Revocation Program TBRi,j
7 Related Work
As we have stressed throughout our discussion, the delegation-revocation frame-
work described by Hagstro¨m et al. is the basis for much of what we have de-
scribed. The Hagstro¨m et al. work gives a semi-formal account of a range of
delegation-revocation schemes, which we have formally represented in the logic
language that we have introduced. We have also described an extension that
allows for representing and reasoning about the beliefs.
We note that ABLP logic [3] and the RTD model [12] allow for some restricted
forms of delegation policies to be represented, but neither approach accommo-
dates the rich range of delegation and revocation schemes that our approach
admits. SPKI/SDSI [6] allows for delegation of privileges on objects via autho-
rization certiﬁcates. However, the delegation policies that may be represented in
the SPKI/SDSI approach are limited to a simple 1-step passing on of privileges
5 The algorithm can be adapted to work over negative permissions.
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on objects; revocation is limited to being typically eﬀected via the expiration of
short-lived certiﬁcates.
Hoek et al. [14] introduce a logic to reason how the abilities of agents and
coalitions of agents are altered by transferring control from one agent to another.
They adopt a dynamic propositional language in which atomic programs are of
the form “agent i transfers the control of variable p to agent j”. Herzig et al.
[10] generalize the logic introduced in [14] by relaxing the assumption that at
most one agent can control a variable. Nevertheless, delegation is still modelled
as transfer and it is not possible to keep track of the delegation chain. In [13],
the main focus is on reasoning about the dynamics of how responsibility can
be acquired, transferred and discharged; delegation is analyzed in relation to
obligations. The approach of accounting for delegation in terms of obligation
creation has some merit, but the proposal does not naturally accommodate the
very rich delegation-revocation framework that we have described. The work by
Demolombe [7] is related to ours in the sense that an epistemic logic is described
for reasoning about trust. However, Demolombe does not consider trust in the
context of the range of delegation-revocation schemes that we have.
8 Conclusions and Further Work
Recall that the principal research question that we have considered is how to de-
ﬁne a formal framework to model and reason about management structures for
distributing access privileges in multi-agent systems? On that, we have described
a very general framework for modelling and reasoning about delegation and re-
vocation schemes in the context of multi-agent authorization. In particular, we
introduced a (dynamic) propositional logic (Section 3) for formulating policies,
we demonstrated how a range of delegation schemes (Section 4) and revocation
schemes (Section 5) can be treated formally within our logic language. Our logic
enables the eﬀects of delegation and revocation actions to be expressed in terms
of the changes they make to a delegation graph. The eﬀects of performing del-
egation and revocation actions are expressible in terms of the “programs” that
we have deﬁned. Evidence for the applicability of our formalization is apparent
in our demonstration that the eight revocation schemes informally presented in
[9] and the delegation types presented in [8] can be represented in our formal
framework. We also showed (Section 6) how a notion of trust can be incorpo-
rated into an extended form of our delegation-revocation framework. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst logical framework for distributed authoriza-
tion that is able to represent the range of delegation-revocation schemes that
are described in [9] and [8] and that accommodates an epistemic language for
explicitly representing trust relations among agents.
In terms of future work, we plan to extend the epistemic model for trust that
we have introduced (Section 6). In distributed authorization, it is often quite
reasonable to model trust as a simple relation between predicates (see [16]).
However, in MAS things can be more complex. For instance, we may need to
admit a transitive model of trust [11] and express policies like “If i believes
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that j trusts z then i believes that z is trustworthy” (e.g., BiBjt(z, (a, o)) →
Bit(z, (a, o))). In such cases, it is useful to have a modal language to nest belief
modalities. The development of such a language is a matter for future work. We
also intend to investigate the possibility of further developing our delegation-
revocation framework to incorporate a notion of time, e.g., for time-constrained
delegation of privileges on objects.
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